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Abstract — One of the key steps in safety risk assessment of an 
Air Traffic Management (ATM) operation is to identify as many 
potential hazards as is possible. All these potential hazards have 
to be analysed upon their possible contribution to safety risk of 
the operation considered. In an agent-based safety risk 
assessment of ATM operations there are two approaches towards 
the assessment of the safety risk impacts of hazards. The direct 
way is to incorporate the hazard in the agent-based model, and to 
assess this agent-based model on safety risk by conducting Monte 
Carlo simulations. The alternative is to avoid the modelling of a 
potential hazard in the agent-based model, and instead assess the 
impact of the hazard on safety risk through sensitivity analysis 
and bias and uncertainty assessment. Because agent-based 
modelling and simulation of hazards might reveal emergent 
behaviour that remains invisible through sensitivity analysis, 
there is a need to understand how to model various hazard types  
in an agent-based model. In order to comply with this need, this 
paper identifies 38 model constructs that are able to capture 
more than 97% of the potential ATM related hazards in an 
agent-based model. The paper also shows that four of the five 
main model constructs are related to four widely used modelling 
domains in aviation, i.e. system reliability, human performance 
simulation, human reliability analysis, and aircraft trajectory 
simulation. However, the model construct that captures the 
highest percentage of hazards (41%) is related to the more recent 
domain of multi-agent systems modelling.   
Keywords- Agent-based modelling; Safety; Human 
performance; Hazards; Multi-agent dynamic risk modelling 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Air Traffic Management (ATM) is a complex socio-
technical system with various interacting human operators and 
technical systems, which aims to safely and efficiently control 
air traffic under various conditions. Motivated by the need to 
model the dynamics, the stochastics and the interactions of 
safety-critical multi-agent systems in advanced ATM concepts 
of operations, NLR has developed the TOPAZ (Traffic 
Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer) safety risk 
assessment methodology, e.g. [1, 2].  
The quantitative part of the TOPAZ methodology develops an 
agent-based model of the operation considered, and 
subsequently uses this model in rare event Monte Carlo (MC) 
simulation and bias and uncertainty analysis. Preceding to this 
quantitative part, the TOPAZ methodology comprises a 
qualitative part which identifies the ATM Concept of 
Operations (ConOps) to be considered and identifies potential 
hazards of this ConOps. All identified hazards should be taken 
into account during the quantitative risk assessment part.  
The TOPAZ methodology supports two quantitative 
approaches in taking a hazard into account. The first approach 
is to assure that the hazard is captured in the agent-based model 
that is used for the MC simulations. The second approach is to 
assess the safety risk impact of the hazard during the bias and 
uncertainty assessment. The advantage of the former approach 
is that potential emergent behaviour of a hazard is assessed 
through MC simulations. The disadvantage is that it tends to 
make the multi-agent model more complex. Because of this 
trade-off, for a specific TOPAZ application it is common 
practice to decide for each hazard how to cover it: either 
through the agent-based model and simulation, or through the 
bias and uncertainty assessment.  
For the majority of the hazards identified during the 
qualitative phase within TOPAZ it is known how to model 
them in an agent-based setting. However there are hazards for 
which it is not yet known how to capture them in an agent-
based model. For this latter category of hazards the only choice 
available is to assess them through bias and uncertainty 
assessment. The aim of this paper is to significantly enlarge the 
set of hazards for which it is known how to model them in an 
agent-based setting. The expected value of accomplishing this 
is two-fold: 
- It completes an agent-based modelling perspective on 
the large variety of hazards occurring in ATM. 
- It lifts the restriction that certain hazards can only be 
evaluated through bias and uncertainty assessment.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an 
explanation of the handling of hazards within the TOPAZ 
safety risk assessment methodology. Section III presents an 
overview of a large database of hazards identified during 
various ATM safety risk analysis studies. Section IV identifies 
a series of model constructs that allow incorporating almost all 
hazards from this database in an agent-based model. Section V 
provides an analysis of the relative importance of the various 
model constructs to model hazards in an agent-based setting. 
Finally, Section VI draws conclusions. 
II. MULTI AGENT DYNAMIC RISK MODELLING (MA-DRM) 
The quantitative modelling and analysis approach in use 
within TOPAZ integrates the following five computational 
modelling techniques: 
· Agent-based Modelling (ABM); 
· Human performance modelling; 
· Powerful Petri Net modelling syntax; 
· Rare event Monte Carlo (MC) simulation; 
· Sensitivity and Bias and uncertainty analysis. 
The integrated use of these complementary techniques is 
also referred to as Multi Agent Dynamic Risk Modelling (MA-
DRM). The motivation for integrating each of these 
complementary techniques is shortly described next. 
From a complexity science perspective, ABM forms a 
logical choice for the evaluation of advanced ATM designs. To 
conceptualise processes in the world, and in particular open 
socio-technical systems such as the ATM system, often an 
agent-oriented perspective is a useful conceptual tool. An ABM 
approach allows the researcher to consider the world’s 
dynamics to be composed from dynamics based on separate but 
interacting processes, e.g. [3, 4]. By having distinguished a 
number of agents and their interaction, the overall process can 
be analysed as emerging from the individual agent processes 
and their interactions. This provides a highly modular and 
transparent way of structuring a model, thus supporting 
analysis, both conceptually and computationally. From a 
hazard modelling perspective this means that for each hazard it 
is identified which agents are involved, and how each agent 
involvement can be captured in the corresponding agent model. 
Within a TOPAZ application, human agents as well as 
technical agents are captured in an ABM by using the wide 
sense agent type definition of [5]: “An agent is anything that 
can be viewed as perceiving its environment through sensors 
and acting upon that environment through effectors.” This also 
means that human operators and technical systems can be 
modelled through clearly distinguishable (groups of) agents. 
For the modelling of technical systems, the model details 
typically can be extracted from technical specifications of the 
specific systems involved. For a human agent an agent-based 
model will be developed by integrating various human 
performance sub-models, e.g. [6, 7]. In addition to this, shared 
and distributed Situation Awareness (SA) across various agents 
is modelled using an extension of the situation awareness (SA) 
model of Endsley [8] to a multi-agent SA (MASA) propagation 
model [9, 10].  
This MASA model makes explicit that in a multi-agent 
system, SA propagates from one agent to another agent. This is 
comparable to the game of ‘Chinese whisper’, where the first 
person whispers a sentence in the ear of the next person, who 
whispers what he understood to the next person, etc. Just as in 
Chinese whisper, where mishearing may sneak in without 
noticing by the participants, errors may sneak in the SA’s of 
agents in a multi agent system without noticing by the agents. 
Because an ATM operation involves many human and 
technical agents, and each of these agents performs dedicated 
tasks and functionalities, the resulting ABM tends to be large. 
In order to manage the systematic development of a 
mathematical model of such operation, use is made of the 
powerful Petri Net (PN) syntactical framework developed by 
[11-14]. The syntax of this powerful PN framework does not 
pose limitations on the model semantics. An additional 
challenge is that ATM safety analysis requires covering many 
magnitude orders in time scales. This can only be 
accomplished through making use of dedicated rare event MC 
simulation techniques, e.g. [15, 16].  
Finally there is a sensitivity and bias and uncertainty 
analysis technique [17] which allows assessing the impact of 
potential differences between the true operation and the agent-
based model on the risk level assessed. The types of differences 
that can be taken into account are: errors in parameter values, 
hazards not modelled, model structure differences from reality 
and potential differences in ConOps interpretation by the 
modellers and how it was meant to be by the ConOps design 
team. 
The above described MA-DRM approach has been applied 
for safety risk assessment of various ATM operations, such as: 
Simultaneous landing on converging runways [18], Active 
runway crossing operations [19] and airborne self-separation 
[20, 21]. For the active runway crossing operation also a 
systematic comparison of the MA-DRM approach against a 
classical event sequence based approach has been made [22, 
23]. This revealed many advantages of the former, including 
considerable differences in the risk results obtained. The only 
disadvantage is that the former requires significant 
computational modelling and rare event simulation 
background. 
III. HAZARDS IN ATM OPERATIONS  
In the process of analysing the safety of air transport 
operations, a prime means in gathering potential hazards is by 
brainstorm sessions with pilots, controllers and other experts. 
These hazard brainstorm sessions aim to push the boundary 
between functionally imaginable and functionally 
unimaginable hazards [24]. Consequently, considerable parts of 
these hazard brainstorm sessions address human behaviour, 
including various conditions and technical systems that 
influence human behaviour and interactions between humans. 
Since 1995, the hazards identified in a broad range of ATM 
safety risk assessments have been collected at NLR in an ATM 
Hazard Database. This collection of hazards contains now more 
than 4000 hazards, though includes equal or similar hazards 
and hazards that refer to a study-specific context, e.g. airport 
layout or route structure.  
In [25] all hazards in the ATM Hazard Database have been 
analyzed in order to select the unique hazards and to formulate 
them in a generalized way (i.e. without referring to study-
specific details). This resulted into a total number of 525 
generalized hazards. Subsequently these 525 generalized 
hazards have been structured in 13 specific clusters as shown in 
Table I. Each hazard is included in one cluster only, also when 
the hazard might have been included in multiple clusters.  
It can be observed in Table I that the hazards cover a wide 
spectrum of issues in ATM, dealing with technical systems, 
human operators and the organization of ATM. 
TABLE I.  NUMBER OF HAZARDS PER CLUSTER AND HAZARD EXAMPLES 
Hazard 
cluster 
Number Examples of hazards 
Aircraft 
systems 
27 
 Aircraft cannot perform requested manoeuvre, 
since it is over its performance limits 
 False alert of an airborne system 
Navigation 
systems 
16 
 Wrong waypoints in database, e.g. due to update 
of flight management system software, errors in 
database, outdated database 
Surveillance 
systems 
27 
 Transponder sends wrong call-sign 
 Track drop 
Speech-based 
communication 
37 
 Failure in frequency changes between subsequent 
air traffic controllers 
 Standard R/T not adhered to 
Datalink-based 
communication 
20 
 Controller does not send a data-link message and 
forgets to give a clearance by voice 
Pilot  
performance 
124 
 Over-reliance on system data 
 Pilot does not know the complexity of the traffic 
situation 
 Alert causes attention tunnelling 
 Change in ATC procedures leads to confusion by 
pilots 
 Pilot mixes up different types of ATC clearances 
 Pilot is fatigued and sleepy 
 Pilot validates without actually checking 
Controller 
performance 
110 
 Risk of a conflict is underestimated 
 Controller wrongly evaluates traffic situation after 
an alert 
 Change of ATC procedures affects fluency of 
controller’s performance 
 Controller has a wrong awareness about the intent 
of aircraft 
 Controllers getting used to new systems, such that 
it becomes hard to do without 
ATC systems 25  Flight plans of ATC system and FMS differ 
ATC 
coordination 
24 
 ATC centres have different versions of aircraft 
trajectory plans 
 Controller is overloaded with coordination tasks 
Weather 27 
 Weather forecast wrong 
 Strong variation in view (e.g. due to snowfall or 
fog patches) 
Traffic 
relations 
33 
 Resolution of conflict leads to other conflict(s) 
 Differences in performance of different aircraft 
types, e.g. at a merging point 
Infrastructure 
& environment 
24 
 Animals on the runway 
 Approach lights are not visible 
Other 31 
 Contingency procedures have not been tested 
 Insufficient capacity of an ATC centre due to 
strike or illness 
 
IV. IDENTIFICATION OF AGENT-BASED MODEL CONSTRUCTS 
A schematic overview of an open multi-agent model is 
shown in Figure 1. This figure, although kept simple for 
presentation purposes, is in principle representative for any 
system that can be conceptualised as a multi-agent system (i.e., 
a system involving n agents that interact with each other and 
with external processes). The model is called open because it 
includes interaction of the system with external processes such 
as the weather. Note that the notion of agent can refer to any 
autonomous system that acts in its environment in order to 
achieve its goals [26]. Human beings (e.g. pilots or air traffic 
controllers) as well as an ‘autonomous’ technical systems (e.g., 
intelligent computer systems like autopilots) may be 
conceptualised as agents. Hence, ATM operations fit well 
within a multi-agent system framework.  
Each agent model can integrate several agent-based model 
constructs. The identification of agent-based model constructs 
is based on the list of hazards presented in Section III. About 
half of the hazards of this list were selected randomly for the 
model construct identification phase. The other half was set 
aside for a later validation phase.   
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Figure 1. Schematic overview of an open hierarchical multi-agent model. 
 
  
For each hazard in the model construct identification set, 
it was analysed which model construct or combination of 
model constructs could represent it. This was done by 
performing ‘mental simulation’, i.e. qualitative reasoning by 
a team of analysts about the way that the models can reflect a 
hazard. The result of this analysis is that a hazard can be well 
covered, partly covered or not covered by the model 
constructs. As part of the analysis argumentation was 
provided about the mechanism by which the models can 
cover a hazard, and the aspects that are yet missing. A 
detailed overview of the results of the analysis is presented in 
([27], Appendix B). 
The ‘mental simulation’ based analysis of the hazard 
modelling capabilities of model constructs was done in three 
phases. First, the model constructs that have been applied in 
TOPAZ safety studies were identified and analysed [28], 
[29]. Table II presents an overview of the 13 TOPAZ based 
model constructs. ‘Mental simulation’ with these 13 model 
constructs showed that 58% of the hazards could be 
modelled well, 11% could be partially modelled and 30% 
could not be modelled by these 13 model constructs.  
During the second phase, 11 complementary model 
constructs have been identified through searching human 
performance sub-models that have been applied by the Agent 
Systems research group at VU University Amsterdam [30]; 
these are shown in Table III. After this extension, 80% of the 
hazards could be well modelled, 7% could be partially 
modelled, and 14% could not be modelled.   
During the third phase, 14 novel model constructs were 
identified for the hazards that had not yet been fully 
modelled by the TOPAZ and VU model constructs [31]; 
these 14 model constructs are presented in Table IV.  
With the total set of 38 (=13+11+14) model constructs, 
‘mental simulation’ based analysis showed that 92% of the 
hazards could be well modelled, 6% could be partially 
modelled, and less than 3% could not be modelled.  
 
 
 
TABLE I.   OVERVIEW OF TOPAZ MODEL CONSTRUCTS 
Code Name Description 
C1 Human 
information 
processing 
(HIP) 
HIP considers processing of information from the 
environment to maintain Situation Awareness 
(SA) and based on this to take actions that may 
influence the environment during tasks that the 
human operator uses for the fulfilment of his/her 
work [32]. The details of a HIP submodel is based 
on a task analysis, and takes into account the 
multiple human resources [32]. This way subtasks 
and resources are modelled according to time-
critical task/resources combinations [6],[33]. 
C2 Multi-agent 
situation 
awareness 
(MASA) 
Situation awareness (SA) addresses perception of 
elements in the environment, their interpretation 
and the projection of the future status [8]. MASA 
has been developed to systematically capture 
potential differences between SAs of different 
agents [9],[10]. To accomplish this, MASA 
addresses the SA of all agents (both human and 
technical) in a multi-agent model, including the 
relations between the SA’s of the individual 
agents. In an air traffic environment the MASA 
submodel captures the SA of each agent as time-
dependent information about the SA of all other 
agents, including identity, continuous state 
variables, mode variables and intent variables  
C3 Task 
identification 
Based on the premise that a human operator has a 
number of tasks, this model construct determines 
the ways that the operator identifies the tasks that 
need to be performed at a particular time instance. 
C4 Task 
scheduling 
Determines which tasks may be performed 
concurrently as well as a priority among the tasks 
that cannot be performed concurrently. 
C5 Task 
execution 
Describes the performance of a human operator 
with regard to the execution of a specific task. The 
performance characteristics depend on the task 
considered. 
C6 Cognitive 
control mode 
This model construct considers that humans can 
function in a number of cognitive control modes, 
such as Strategic, Tactical, Opportunistic and 
Scrambled [34]. The cognitive control mode may 
depend on human performance aspects such as the 
range of tasks to be done and the situation 
awareness of the human. 
C7 Task load Describes the number of tasks to be performed, as 
considered in the task scheduling process. The 
task load influences the cognitive control mode of 
the human operator. At a more detailed level, the 
task load may also describe the resources required 
by tasks at the level of visual, auditory, cognitive 
and motor performance. 
C8 Human error This model construct covers slips, lapses, mode 
errors and knowledge and rule-based mistakes that 
may occur during the human information 
processing steps [35],[32]. It does not represent in 
detail the mechanisms that may have given rise to 
the error, but it considers the behaviour resulting 
from these mechanisms at a probabilistic level for 
a specific task. The error probability is task 
specific and is influenced by other model 
constructs, such as the cognitive control mode. 
For instance, the probability of an error is higher 
in the Opportunistic control mode than in the 
Tactical control mode.  
C9 Decision 
making 
A model construct for the decision making 
process of human operators in safety relevant 
situations. It describes the decision making on the 
basis of the situation awareness and decision rules 
by a human agent. 
C10 System mode Describes the behaviour of a technical system by 
different modes. These modes are discrete states 
for the functioning of technical systems, such as 
failure conditions, system settings, etc. Mode 
switching may happen stochastically or as a result 
of an outside input to the technical system. 
C11 Dynamic 
variability 
Describes the variability of states of agents due to 
dynamic processes. For instance, it can describe 
the movements of an aircraft according to 
differential equations relating states such as 
position, velocity, acceleration and thrust. 
C12 Stochastic 
variability 
Describes the stochastic variability in the 
performance of human operators and technical 
systems. For a human operator it specifies the 
variability in task aspects (e.g. duration, start time, 
accuracy) under the given conditions.  
C13 Contextual 
condition 
Captures the context of the operation, such as 
weather, route structure, environmental conditions 
and airport infrastructure. It has similarity with the 
model construct System mode (C10). However, 
the construct System mode is restricted to 
technical systems. 
TABLE II.  OVERVIEW OF VU MODEL CONSTRUCTS. 
Code Name Brief description 
MC1 Object-
oriented 
attention 
Describes the development of a human’s state of 
attention over time, as a function of the person’s 
gaze direction, the locations of the objects in the 
environment, and their characteristics (such as 
their brightness and size). 
MC2 (Experience-
based) 
decision 
making 
Describes a person’s decision making process, 
based on either the expected outcomes or the 
experienced emotional response (called somatic 
marker [36]) of an option. 
MC3 Operator 
functional 
state 
Determines a person’s functional state as a 
dynamical state, which is a function of task 
properties and personal characteristics. The 
model [37] is based on two different theories: 
(1) the cognitive energetic framework, which 
states that effort regulation is based on human 
recourses and determines human performance in 
dynamic conditions, and (2) the idea that when 
performing sports, a person’s generated power 
can continue on a critical power level without 
becoming more exhausted. 
MC4 Information 
presentation 
This model construct consists of two interacting 
dynamical models, one to determine the 
human’s functional state (see MC3) and one to 
determine the effects of the chosen type and 
form of information presentation. 
MC5 Safety culture A model construct for various aspects of safety 
culture, including organisational, cultural and 
individual aspects. An application of the model 
to an occurrence reporting cycle is available in 
the context of an existing air navigation service 
provider [38]. 
MC6 Situation 
awareness 
(with complex 
beliefs) 
An extension of the model of Endsley [8], which 
includes the perception of cues, the 
comprehension and integration of information, 
and the projection of information for future 
events. In particular, some sophisticated AI-
based inference algorithms based on mental 
models are incorporated, as well as the notion of 
aggregated complex beliefs. 
MC7 Trust Describes trust as a dynamical, numerical 
variable which is influenced based on 
experiences in combination with several 
individual characteristics. 
MC8 Formal 
organisation 
Can be used to model formal organisations from 
three interrelated perspectives (views): the 
process-oriented view, the performance-oriented 
view, and the organisation-oriented view. A 
formal organisation is imposed on 
organisational agents, described in the agent-
oriented view. 
MC9 Learning Addresses learning in the context of decision 
making. By neurological learning processes, the 
decision making mechanism is adapted to 
experiences, sush that decision choices made are 
reasonable or in some way rational, given the 
environment reflected in these past experiences. 
MC10 Goal-oriented 
attention 
Describes how an ‘ambient’ agent (either human 
of artificial) can analyse another agent’s state of 
attention, and to act according to the outcomes 
of such an analysis and its own goals. 
MC11 Extended 
mind 
Represents the philosophical notion of an 
extended mind [39], i.e., an ‘external state of the 
environment that has been created by an agent 
and helps this agent in its mental processing’. It 
can be used to explain the similarities and 
differences between reasoning based on internal 
mental states (e.g., beliefs) and reasoning based 
on external mental states (e.g., flight process 
strips). 
TABLE III.  OVERVIEW OF NOVEL MODEL CONSTRUCTS. 
Code Name Brief description 
NM2 Approach Captures the factors that influence pilot task 
demand during final approach, based on Task 
Demand Load (i.e., the objective difficulty of 
the task performed by the pilot that is flying an 
approach) and mental load (i.e., the workload as 
experienced by the pilot performing the task). 
NM3 Handling 
inconsistent 
information 
Probabilistic model for a technical system that, 
upon receiving inconsistent information as 
input, generates one of the following four types 
of response: 1) processing the input information 
correctly, 2) processing the input information 
incorrectly, 3) leaving the input information 
unchanged, and have the user solve the 
inconsistency, and 4) generating an error 
message. 
NM7 Group 
emotion  
Describes the dynamics of the spread of 
emotion over a group of individuals, based on 
personal characteristics of the individuals and 
relations between individuals. 
NM14 Surprise (A) Describes the generation of surprise based on: 
1) expectation disconfirmation, 2) importance of 
the observed event, 3) valence (i.e., whether the 
observed event is seen as positive or negative), 
4) difficulty of explaining / fitting it in an 
existing schema, and 5) novelty (contrast with 
earlier experiences). In this particular case the 
model is applied to complex procedures. 
NM15 Surprise (B) Describes the generation of surprise based on: 
1) expectation disconfirmation, 2) importance of 
the observed event, 3) valence (i.e., whether the 
observed event is seen as positive or negative), 
4) difficulty of explaining / fitting it in an 
existing schema, and 5) novelty (contrast with 
earlier experiences). In this particular case the 
model is applied to changes in procedures. 
NM21 Deciding 
when to take 
action 
Model that enables an agent to make a 
deliberation between exploration (i.e., collecting 
more information about the world state before 
making an action) and exploitation (i.e., 
exploiting its current knowledge to choose an 
action to perform). 
NM31 Access rights  Probabilistic model that, based on a request of 
an actor to have access to the system, 
determines whether this access in indeed 
granted or not. 
NM32 Merging or 
splitting ATC 
sectors 
Model that describes the process of merging and 
splitting ATC sectors as a form of 
organisational change. Changes in the 
decomposition of ATC sectors are represented 
by dynamic re-allocation of agents to roles, 
triggered by the amount of work load. 
NM33 Bad weather Probabilistic model that represents visibility via 
multiple discrete modes (e.g., for good 
visibility, reduced visibility and no visibility), 
between which switches take place based on 
statistics of the specific airport considered. 
NM34 Weather 
forecast wrong 
Probabilistic model that determines errors in 
weather forecast, among others, in terms of 
deviations from predicted wind velocity and 
direction. 
NM35 Turbulence Probabilistic model that switches between 
turbulence intensity categories based on specific 
sources like Convective Induced Turbulence, 
Clear Air Turbulence, and Mountain Wave 
Turbulence. 
NM36 Icing Upon receiving input in terms of weather 
information and de-icing or anti-icing methods, 
this model determines the extend of ice 
formation on an aircraft. 
NM38 Influence of 
many agents 
on flight 
planning 
Represents the influence of many agents on 
flight planning within organisations, using the 
generic organisation modelling framework from 
[40], which includes notions like roles, power 
relations between roles, and principles of 
allocation of roles to agents. 
NM40 Uncontrolled 
aircraft 
Switches between two discrete modes 
(controlled and loss of control), depending on 
the following factors: 1) Significant Systems or 
Systems Control Failure, 2) Structural Failure 
and/or Loss of Power, 3) Crew Incapacitation, 
4) Flight Management or Control Error, 5) 
Environmental Factors, 6) Aircraft Load, and 7) 
Malicious Interference. 
 
TABLE IV.  HAZARD MODELLING RESULTS: USE OF THE AGENT-BASED 
MODEL CONSTRUCTS AND LEVELS OF HAZARDS MODELLING. 
Model construct 
Number of 
hazards 
C1 Human information processing 38 14.3% 
C2 Multi-agent situation awareness 110 41.4% 
C3 Task identification 11 4.1% 
C4 Task scheduling 15 5.6% 
C5 Task execution 21 7.9% 
C6 Cognitive control mode 11 4.1% 
C7 Task load 5 1.9% 
C8 Human error 48 18.0% 
C9 Decision making 13 4.9% 
C10 System mode 53 19.9% 
C11 Dynamic variability 23 8.6% 
C12 Stochastic variability 8 3.0% 
C13 Contextual condition 17 6.4% 
MC1 Object-oriented attention 8 3.0% 
MC2 (Experience-based) decision making 11 4.1% 
MC3 Operator functional state 22 8.3% 
MC4 Information presentation 6 2.3% 
MC5 Safety culture 7 2.6% 
MC6 Situation awareness with complex beliefs 17 6.4% 
MC7 Trust 18 6.8% 
MC8 Formal organisation 9 3.4% 
MC9 Learning 7 2.6% 
MC10 Goal-oriented attention 2 0.8% 
MC11 Extended mind 5 1.9% 
NM2 Approach 1 0.4% 
NM3 Handling inconsistent information 1 0.4% 
NM7 Group emotion  1 0.4% 
NM14 Surprise (A) 9 3.4% 
NM15 Surprise (B) 8 3.0% 
NM21 Deciding when to take action 1 0.4% 
NM31 Access rights  2 0.8% 
NM32 Merging or splitting ATC sectors 1 0.4% 
NM33 Bad weather 9 3.4% 
NM34 Weather forecast wrong 1 0.4% 
NM35 Turbulence 1 0.4% 
NM36 Icing 1 0.4% 
NM38 Influence of many agents on flight planning 1 0.4% 
NM40 Uncontrolled aircraft 1 0.4% 
- Not modelled 6 2.3% 
 
V. HAZARD MODELLING RESULTS 
The identification of model constructs in Section IV was 
based on a ‘mental simulation’ based analysis of their ability 
to model hazards in ATM. Table V presents an overview of 
the number and percentages of hazards covered for each of 
the 38 model constructs.   
 It follows from Table V that of the total set of 38 model 
constructs, there are 10 model constructs that are used for 
modelling one specific hazard in the set considered. The 
other 28 model constructs are used for modelling multiple 
hazards, i.e. ranging from 2 till 110 hazards. The highest 
number/percentage of hazards (110 / 41.4%) applies for the 
multi-agent situation awareness construct C2. In addition to 
C2, also various other model constructs from the TOPAZ 
base have been applied most frequently
1
.  
The results in Table V show that the five highest ranking 
model constructs are: 
Rank 1 (41.4%): C2 ‘Multi-agent situation awareness’ 
Rank 2 (19.9%): C10 ‘System mode’,  
Rank 3 (18.0%): C8 ‘Human error’,  
Rank 4 (14.3%): C1: ‘Human Information Processing’,  
Rank 5 (8.6%): C11: ‘Dynamic Variability’ 
The model constructs that rank 2
nd
 through 5
th
 are based 
on model developments within four widely studied domains, 
i.e. system reliability analysis, human reliability analysis,  
human performance simulation, and aircraft trajectory 
simulation,. In contrast with this, the by far highest ranking 
model construct C2 ‘Multi-agent situation awareness’ 
belongs to the novel domain of multi-agent systems. These 
relations are further explained next.  
Number 1: C2, ‘Multi-agent SA’. As has been explained 
in Section II, this model construct has been developed in the 
domain of agent-based modelling and simulation of ATM 
operations [9, 10]. The development of this model construct 
was motivated by the recognition of the many hazards 
involving differences in between SA of different agents 
(human-human as well as human-technical system), and that 
such differences tend to propagate further through the multi-
agent system. 
Number 2, C10 ‘System mode’ represents a broad range 
of technical system modes (e.g., failure modes). This kind of 
model construct corresponds very well with the way how 
reliability, availability and maintainability of technical 
systems is modelled in event sequence based analysis.  
Number 3, C8 ‘Human error’ represents the basic errors 
that can be made by a human [35]. These basic errors consist 
of slips in speech, memory or physical actions that arises 
from the unconscious mind, memory lapses and mode errors 
that are due to weak recollection of recent events or data, and 
knowledge and rule based mistakes that may be made by a 
human. Model construct C6 “Cognitive Control Mode” 
(4.1%) may have significant impact on C8. It should be 
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 The hazard scores for the 25 novel model constructs are 
influenced by the incremental process that has been followed in the 
analysis of the hazards. First all hazards were analysed by the 
TOPAZ-based model constructs, then the remaining hazards were 
coupled to the novel model constructs.  
noticed that C6 and C8 form a small subset only of the large 
range of human factors considered within the domain of 
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA), e.g. [41]. For example, 
in a classical event sequence based safety risk analysis, HRA 
is used to handle hazards related to model construct C3, but 
also to handle hazards related to model constructs C1 and 
C2.   
Number 4, C1: ‘Human Information Processing’, is a 
model construct that is commonly used in human 
performance simulation [6]. A significant role is played by 
the manner how a human operator manages competing task 
demands. This is captured through model constructs
2
: C3: 
Task identification (4.1%), C4: Task scheduling (5.6%), C5: 
‘Task execution’ (7.9%; rank 7), C7: ‘Task load’ (1.9%), and 
C9: ‘Decision making’ (4.9%).  
Number 5, C11: ‘Dynamic Variability’ is a model 
construct that allows using differential equations, for 
example to model aircraft evolution behaviour. Hence this is 
a model construct that is commonly used in a large set of 
real-time and fast-time simulators in aviation. Within 
TOPAZ the model construct C12 ‘stochastic variability’ 
typically allows to also model random influences, such as 
wind variations. 
For the 25 newly identified model constructs,  the highest 
applicability has been found for MC3 ‘Operator functional 
state’ (8.3%; rank 6), which relates task demands, effort, 
exhaustion and personal characteristics of human operators; 
MC7 ‘Trust’ (6.8%; rank 8), which represents trust of human 
operators in technical systems or other human operators; and 
MC6 ‘Situation awareness with complex beliefs’ (6.4%; rank 
9), which represents formation of complex beliefs on the 
basis of observations and mental models.   
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
As demonstrated in various TOPAZ applications and 
evaluations [18-22], multi-agent dynamic risk modelling 
(MA-DRM) is a powerful approach in safety risk assessment 
of changes in ATM operations. In particular, this agent-based 
modelling approach provides the capability to represent the 
performance and interactions of agents in the ATM socio-
technical system, and to derive accident risk as an emergent 
property by Monte Carlo simulations.  
Through a series of studies [29-31], 38 specific model 
constructs have been identified that allow to model 
(partially) well over 97% of the large set of hazards 
considered. Of these 38 model constructs, 13 are commonly 
in use within the TOPAZ safety risk assessment 
methodology, and 25 are novel. The 13 TOPAZ based model 
constructs appear to be able in modelling about 70% of the 
hazards (partially) well. Together with the 25 novel model 
constructs this percentage increases to over 97%. In other 
words, the percentage of hazards for which it is not fully 
known how to model them in an agent-based approach has 
been reduced from 30% to less than 3%. For MA-DRM 
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 In [29] these complementary model constructs are assumed to 
make implicit part of the the model construct C1. 
applications this means that the percentage of hazards for 
which the risk impact could only be assessed through bias 
and uncertainty assessment has been reduced from 30% to 
less than 3%.  
The results obtained in this paper also show that the top 
five ranking hazard model constructs are all coming from the 
TOPAZ base. The highest ranking model construct C2 
‘Multi-agent situation awareness’ belongs to the novel 
domain of multi-agent systems. The model constructs that 
rank 2
nd
 through 5
th
 are based on developments within four 
widely studied modelling domains in aviation: 
- System reliability analysis, 
- Human reliability analysis (HRA) 
- Human performance simulation, 
- Aircraft trajectory simulation. 
It also was noticed that in an agent-based modelling and 
simulation approach, HRA has to capture a much smaller 
subset of hazards then it has to do in a classical event 
sequence based safety risk analysis. For example, in a 
classical event sequence based approach, hazards related to 
the model constructs C1 (Human Information Processing) 
and C2 (Multi-agent Situation Awareness) have also to be 
covered by HRA, whereas in an agent based approach these 
are covered through models from the human performance 
simulation and multi-agent modelling and simulation 
domains.   
In follow-up research it will be studied how the 25 newly 
identified model constructs can be integrated with the 13 
existing TOPAZ based model constructs. A complementary 
question that will be studied is which of the 38 model 
constructs should be incorporated in an agent-based model 
and which should better be covered through bias and 
uncertainty analysis. As it has been explained in the 
introduction, the advantage of the former approach is that 
potential emergent behaviour of a hazard is assessed through 
MC simulations. A disadvantage is that it tends to make the 
multi-agent model more complex. Because of this trade-off, 
for each hazard there should be some optimal way in 
capturing its impact on the safety risk. For a specific 
application, such optimum can then for example be reached 
by an iterative development of a Multi-Agent Dynamic Risk 
Model (MA-DRM). 
Complementary follow-up research is to use the agent-
based model constructs of hazards in the continuation of our 
study [28] of a mathematical approach towards resilience 
engineering.         
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